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‘The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein’s totality is grounded in 
temporality.’ (Heidegger 2007: 488) 
‘Human time is always a rolling accumulation of traces of previous time, taken 
up into the body and bound up with intentions directed at the future.’ 





ABSTRACT: Using Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway as primary text to illuminate the human 
experience of time, it is argued against T. Armstrong (in Modernism) that the depiction of time 
by Modernist writers such as Woolf is Heideggerian rather than Bergsonian. This study is used 
to reveal the originality of Heidegger as opposed to Bergson, whose ideas on time, it is 
suggested, are merely an accumulation of traces of previous ideas on time. Drawing on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysica, De Interpretatione, Ethico Nicomachea, Rhetorica and Physica to develop a new 
vocabulary, Heidegger revealed the distinctive ontological foundation of space and time in 
connecting temporality with being. The characters in Mrs. Dalloway illustrate the difference 
between an authentic and an inauthentic relation to the temporality of being. 




The disambiguation of Martin Heidegger’s conception of time can be found 
profoundly in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, which will be my primary text. 
Heidegger published Being and Time in 1927, Woolf published Mrs. Dalloway in 1925, 
thus these two masterpieces of literature will be my starting point. Armstrong has 
noted that the human experience of time in Modernity was helped shaped 
fundamentally by the studies of Bergson. I would like to argue against Armstrong on 
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this matter, as Bergson’s theories on time can also be described as an accumulation of 
traces of previous ideas on time. Bergson’s account of time was essentially determined 
by Aristotle. My understanding of the depiction of time by Modernist writers (such as 
Woolf) is not so much Bergsonian but much more Heideggerian. Heidegger’s Being and 
Time rethinks time very differently to Bergson, drawing in particular upon Aristotle’s 
Metaphysica, De Interpretatione, Ethico Nicomachea, Rhetorica and Physica. Heidegger uses an 
elaborate vocabulary of his own, discarding traditional terminology. Adverbs, 
prepositions, pronouns and conjunctions are often used by him as nouns, thus my 
following argumentation may not seem as cogent as usual due to Heideggerian 
innovations in linguistics. 
The analytical framework of this article will utilise Heidegger contra Bergson. To 
be specific, the departure of Heidegger on the concept of time as one of space and 
time as having a distinctive ontological function which connects temporality with 
being. This will be done to shed light on the fictional Modernist narratives of Woolf. 
The following quote is extracted from a chapter entitled: Dasein’s authentic 
potentiality-for-being-a-whole, and temporality as the ontological meaning of care in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time: 
An authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole on the part of Dasein has been 
projected existentially. By analysing this phenomenon, we have revealed that 
authentic Being-towards-death is anticipation. Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-
being, in its existientiell attestation, has been exhibited, and at the same time 
existentially Interpreted, as resoluteness. (Heidegger 2007: 349) 
Clarissa Dalloway fears the forward progression of time, thus she is inauthentic in her 
being-towards-death. As Mrs. Dalloway (like Joyce’s Ulysses) takes place in one single 
day, this inauthenticity stems from her spending the majority of that day reminiscing 
over a former infatuation. This obsession has lasted three decades, which Woolf 
weaves into the narrative with analepsis. The Dasein of Clarissa and her potentialities 
are abstracted by windows or mirrors, frames in which, the perspective of a 
constructed moment can be suspended in time. 
This contrasts radically with the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of Septimus 
Warren Smith. As preceding his suicide he contemplates and anticipates his death. 
Time is not suspended or frozen for Septimus. Flashbacks are less formative of the 
future for Septimus unlike Clarissa. It is clear that the two characters do not inhabit 
the same time. To clarify, Clarissa’s existential intentions directed at the future are 
inauthentic while Septimus has an authentic interpretation of time as the horizon of 
being. 
Heidegger thought that our being can be divided up into finitude as mortality and 
finitude as nullity; where we cannot exist authentically without fully grasping our 
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existential choices in the face of our finitude. The death of previous traces of time, 
which cannot be changed, but determine the future has to be resolutely anticipated. 
This anticipation makes intentions directed at the future authentic, as it removes 
Dasein from its lostness in the they and returns its individuality. Future intentions are 
limited because death reminds us that our possibilities are finite. 
To clarify, it is the anticipatory resoluteness that a choice made may be one’s last 
and grasping the moment (as it emerges from the preceding moment) that the 
possibilities of the coming moment become authentic. This is how Dasein as a whole 
comes to expression, through acceptance of one’s approaching death. Being-towards-
death is the only way Dasein’s totality can be revealed and thus authenticated. To 
summarise this point: death completes one’s identity by totalizing and individualising 
Dasein. 
The suicide of Septimus, and his thoughts preceding this event, is a Modern 
fictional example of authentic being-towards-death. Clarissa lacks this anticipation; her 
time is less psychological, internal and measured by emotion. The striking of Big Ben 
at three o’clock has to give her narrative a structural temporality. This external, 
historical, linear clock time has no structural effect on Septimus due to his shell-
shocked state, yet he has realised that time is constitutive for Being-in-the-world. 
Septimus in his ill health doesn’t live by the ordinary, traditional conception of time. 
This is how Clarissa’s time differs, as Clarissa is subject to an externalization of a 
‘qualitative time’ into space akin to Bergson’s interpretation of time. Alternatively, 
Septimus (albeit unwittingly due to madness) finds Clarissa’s time ontologically 
indefinite and inadequate. Evidence of the influence of external, quantitative time on 
Clarissa is found very early on the novel: 
For having lived in Westminster – how many years now? Over twenty, – one 
feels even in the midst of the traffic, or waking at night, Clarissa was positive, a 
particular hush, or solemnity; an indescribable pause; a suspense (but that might 
be her heart, affected, they said, by influenza) before Big Ben strikes. There! Out 
it boomed. First a warning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable. (Woolf 2000: 4) 
Here both internal time (Clarissa’s heartbeat) and external time (Big Ben) are 
shown as part of the Urban experience. Big Ben could be a metaphor for the 
archaeology of time, the time inherited by Bergson from Aristotle: time manifested as 
space, through the irrevocable striking of the hour. Clarissa mentions that she has lived 
in Westminster for over twenty years, yet the soft city of Septimus in his delusional 
state is maybe more authentic and real than the hard city of Clarissa’s. Rather than 
Big Ben reminding Clarissa of her finitude, it is a piece of architecture that is more 
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symbolic of freezing time. The recurrence of three o’clock throughout the discourse 
supports this idea. 
My juxtaposition of the characters Clarissa and Septimus is clarified by Clarissa’s 
being-towards-death. Her being-towards-death is made explicit in an interior 
monologue concerning Peter. She feels that somehow in the streets of London both 
she and Peter survive. She feels immortalised in the landscape of the city in a stream of 
consciousness akin to a daydream. For Heidegger, Dasein is essentially Being with 
Others. The thought of Clarissa’s that both herself and Peter survive in the 
architecture of London is an inauthentic manifestation of Dasein. According to 
Heidegger, the Dasein of Others (like our own) only reaches its wholeness in death; 
thus Peter’s Dasein would remain incomplete if Clarissa’s assertion transpired. From a 
deconstructionist’s perspective, Clarissa does not think concretely on this matter, prior 
to her idea that she survives her death, there is a self-subversion: 
Did it matter then, she asked herself, walking towards Bond Street, did it matter 
that she must inevitably cease completely; all this must go on without her; did she 
resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe that death ended absolutely? 
(Woolf 2000: 9) 
The inevitability and/or consolation of death contradicts her following notion of 
immortality. This deconstruction doesn’t erase Clarissa’s inauthentic being-towards-
death, it just highlights a point in the text where psychological/biological time and 
linear Clock time intersect. Derrida or Irigaray maybe would describe this intersection 
as an aporia. 
The dying of the Other is the most important idea being contemplated (on this 
page) by Clarissa. If Heidegger is correct, the end and totality of Dasein can only be 
conceived in each case as one’s own, thus Clarissa cannot authentically conceive 
Peter’s death; as Peter’s death is his own exclusively. Death is an existential 
phenomenon. The existential meaning of Peter’s coming-to-an-end is not addressed by 
Clarissa. Her thoughts turn to the people of London, (the they) which Heidegger 
would describe as falling. Falling is the evasion of death through fleeing in the face of 
it. The ‘they’ or the inhabitants of London in this part of the novel does not permit 
Clarissa the courage for anxiety in the face of death. 
The car had gone, but it had left a slight ripple which flowed through the glove 
shops and hat shops and tailors’ shops on both sides of Bond Street. For thirty 
seconds all heads were inclined the same way – to the window […] strangers 
looked at each other and thought of the dead; of the flag of Empire. (Woolf 2000 
: 19) 
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This everyday scene describes an indifference towards the uttermost possibility of 
existence subsiding briefly. To clarify, for thirty seconds there is authentic being-
towards-death collectively. By thinking of the dead, the ‘they’ (for thirty seconds) 
become individualised through each stranger facing their own potentiality-for-being. 
They themselves realise the constraints of time. The gaze of the Other projects death 
as a limitation of possibilities for thirty seconds. This is contra Bergson’s notion that 
there is no moment, that our concept of now is only a scientific abstraction. Heidegger 
would describe this moment in Bond street as one of an existential-ontological 
connection; as death becoming a possibility of Dasein’s being. Perhaps existence 
reaches its height of authenticity in this scenario. The ultimate definition of an 
individual is the possibility of having no more possibilities, which is death, as no one 
else can share one’s own mortality. 
Death imposes a limit on us, a boundary on our potentialities, and manifests our 
finitude by making it present in Dasein’s existence. To clarify, Dasein is not endless 
because its possibilities are determined by death. This disambiguation of Heideggerian 
thought is present at this early stage in the novel. 
Thrown projection is the catalyst behind Dasein’s existence. It throws one into the 
moment that is grounded in previous moments, which in turn grounds moments to 
come. Time, as the human horizon, perhaps is the underlying meaning of Dasein. 
How one orientates oneself in thrownness, especially in the narrow time limit available 
in life, is of the utmost significance. This means that we do not necessarily exist in 
time, but rather we exist as temporality fundamentally. 
Septimus becomes liberated from his thrown projection through madness. Clarissa 
and Peter’s illusions of the ‘they’ however are augmented by the sound of Big Ben 
striking on page 52 and more importantly on page 69 when they last meet. To clarify, 
Septimus has a freedom towards death which Peter does not. Although Septimus 
could not look upon the dead on page 76, later in contemplating suicide, he realises 
that death is the horizon of his being. The novel ends with Peter in extraordinary 
excitement from crossing paths with Clarissa again, yet this may be naïve because this 
could be cut short by an accident, such as when Clarissa’s sister was killed by a falling 
tree on page 85. 
Peter doesn’t anticipate the future possibility of such an abrupt death, thus his 
excitement is inauthentic. He forgets his past sorrow and how he felt thrown into it on 
page 69. An authentic moment of vision (at this point) would have been to consider the 
repetition of these earlier events and death as being a possible boundary. 
Septimus, by plotting his death, has a better conception of Dasein’s temporality. 
The psychological death of Septimus is quite surreal, yet paradoxically the realest in 
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terms of facing temporality as the horizon of being. Perhaps Septimus mirrors a 
surreality: where dream and reality form an absolute surrealist reality. The surreal 
world of Septimus appears mad and thus is dismissed by Dr. Holmes, yet this is merely 
a superficial account, an external account by the Other. Internally, Septimus 
anticipates the completion of his Dasein through suicide, which is rational and quite 
sane. Dr. Holmes’ temporality differs to the temporality of Septimus. 
Mad Septimus is a very Modern character, perhaps even post-modern. The 
dismemberment of logic he displays can be found in Marinetti’s futurism, Breton’s 
surrealism and later in the post-structuralism of Derrida (as a reaction against de 
Saussure). Septimus dissolves binary logic, logic has failed him. Logic has shattered his 
nerves and confidence in morality. He refutes logic after the War, as fighting for 
civilisation seems to him an absurdity. 
On an ontological level, the post-War shift into surreality by Septimus is 
unacceptable for Dr. Holmes. The negation of logic and Clock time is not allowed by 
his London society. Monumental time is the sole authority ideologically. Big Ben 
operates as a permanent force. It is a tradition for Big Ben to regulate time politically. 
This regulation of time alienates Septimus. Big Ben, as a Bergsonian representation of 
time in a closed space, is rejected by Septimus. 
Alienation only consecrates, with didactic insistence and systematic heaviness, the 
non-participation of spectators (and even of directors and actors) in the creative 
act, in the irruptive force fissuring the space of the stage […] All the limits 
furrowing classical theatricality (represented/representer, signified/signifier, 
author/director/actors/spectators, stage/audience, text/interpretation, etc) were 
ethico-metaphysical prohibitions, wrinkles, grimaces, rictuses – the symptoms of 
fear before the dangers of the festival. (Derrida 1978 : 244) 
Septimus feels alienated from society, which is expounded by never meeting Clarissa 
in the novel. The stage of London is fissured by these two stories alongside each other. 
The War has left Septimus feeling like a spectator in a theatre of cruelty. As a casualty 
of this War he becomes introspective and withdrawn while the spectacle surrounds 
him, ethico-metaphysical prohibitions become a blurred and indistinct to him. 
Lucrezia feels just as alienated because she is a stranger to the city, in a different 
temporality to her own perhaps. 
Clarissa fears Miss Kilman’s possession of Elizabeth which is a danger of the 
festival of London. Each character has a different perception of what reality is, 
different fears and different temporalities. Time for the directors (like Dr. Holmes) 
differs from the time for the actors such as Septimus, yet they share the same stage. 
Co-presence and temporality is what makes the festival of London life cruel, as it is 
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difficult to maintain authenticity when subjected to the temporality of the other 
because monumental time dictates that there is only one temporality. 
For Sartre, there are three temporal dimensions: the past, present and future: The 
past is facticity, it cannot be changed, it is in-itself. The present is for-itself in contrast, 
this is because of its presence. Interestingly, the pasts being-in-itself exists as a totality 
because of the presence of the for-itself of the present. Beings in our world are co-
present, because this universal for-itself establishes our presence. 
But the present is not only the For-itself’s non-being making itself present. As 
For-itself, it has being outside of it, before and behind. Behind, it was its past; and 
before, it will be its future. It is a flight outside of co-present being and from the 
being which it was, toward the being it will be. (Sartre 1969: 123) 
To conclude, Modernist being receives its meaning from the future. The lack of 
meaning in the for-itself becomes conscious, as it has a consciousness towards the 
possibilities of the future. The present is also conscious of the past and this dimension 
of time is called reflection. This is a consciousness of the succession of events 
structuring temporality. There is a lot of dense thought which needs unpacking in this 
quotation. Intricate movements away from Heidegger and the history of being is at 
work here. Sartre considers the in – itself as an abstraction without consciousness. The 
for-itself’s passion only catalyses there to be in -itself. The serious ontological doubts 
surrounding being set forth by Hume’s challenges are part of the foundations of this 
departure. These challenges awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber on being and 
provoked him to re-question the distinction between things – in – themselves and 
appearances. Although Hume and Kant where primarily philosophers, Sartre and 
Heidegger (in his later work) suggest that perhaps the question of being cannot be 
undertaken independently of literature, art or science. Sartre was a playwright and a 
novelist as well as a philosopher. Hume was a economist and historian as well as a 
philosopher. Near Cambridge, in the Grantchester meadows, temporality, economics 
and novels were openly discussed between Woolf, Keynes, Russell and Wittgenstein. 
On and off stage, the entanglement of being, literature and time is a distinct feature of 
Modernity. A refined point should conclude this article. 
There would be no present, that is to say, no sensible world with its thickness and 
inexhaustible richness, if perception, in Hegel’s words, did not retain a past in the 
depth of the present, and not contract that past into that depth. (Merleau-Ponty 
2002: 279) 
Hegel’s thoughts on time are analysed by Heidegger in a sustained manner from 
pages 428 to 436 of Being and Time. Septimus can be thought of (in this Heideggerian 
context) as setting himself free for death, throwing back upon his factical there or 
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factical presence. Paradoxically, He takes over his thrownness with a moment of vision 
for his time. This is authentic, finite temporality, turning his fate into authentic 
historicality. Counter to Hegel, time appears as the very fate and necessity where his 
spirit becomes complete. There is no need to wait until dusk falls for the owl of 
Minerva to spread its wings and fly. 
 
University of Cambridge 
avellopublishing@yahoo.co.uk 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Armstrong, T. Modernism (Cambridge: Polity Press. 2005). 
Derrida, J. Writing and Difference [1967] tr. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago. 
1978). 
Heidegger, M. Being and Time [1927] tr. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 2007). 
Merleau-Ponty, M. Phenomenology of Perception [1945] tr. Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge Classics. 2002). 
Sartre, J.P. Being and Nothingness [1943] tr. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington 
Square Press. 1969). 
Woolf, V. Mrs. Dalloway (Oxford: University Press. 2000). 
 
